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This paper has three objectives: to explore the nature of the problem implicit in the
term "risk acceptability," to examine the possible contributions of scientific information
to risk standard-setting, and to argue that societal response is best guided by consider-
ations ofprocess rather than formal methods ofanalysis.
Most technological risks are not accepted but are imposed. There is also little reason to
expect consensus among individuals on their tolerance ofrisk. Moreover, debates about
risk levels are often at base debates over the adequacy ofthe institutions which manage
the risks. Scientific information can contribute three broad types of analyses to risk-
setting deliberations: contextual analysis, equity assessment, and public preference
analysis.
More effective risk-setting decisions will involve attention to the process used, particu-
larly in regard to the requirements ofprocedural justice and democratic responsibility.
Recent events have conspired to intensify the
societal discussion ofthe level ofrisk appropriate
for the control of technological hazards. The Su-
preme Court decision on the OSHA regulation to
control the exposure of workers to benzene, for
example, called for a determination of the pres-
ence ofsignificant risks that could be reduced by
the new standard, but not that the work environ-
ment be made risk-free (1). The recent Reagan
Administration proposal to relax or eliminate 35
air quality or safety regulations (2) has raised
anewthe conflicts between an ailing economy and
life-saving measures. The Three Mile Island acci-
dent of 1979 has provoked increased calls for a
safety goal to which all nuclear regulation and
licensing should aspire. Even the popular press
has joined the fray, airing issues usually re-
stricted to scientists and regulators.
These concerns have generally been character-
ized by the question: how safe is safe enough? In
fact, this posing ofthe question has done much to
muddle serious discussion of a complex problem.
There are even those who assume that this ques-
tion can and should be answered. Yet, settingrisk
standards involves thorny choices between en-
larging benefits and reducing risks, healthier
workplaces versus increased unemployment, and
present versus future well-being. It is a situation
ideally designed to breed indecision among be-
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leaguered public officials whose training and ex-
perience are remote from the skills needed to
resolve such issues.
This paper has three objectives:
* To explore the nature ofthe problem implicit
in the term "risk acceptability"
* To examine the possible contributions of sci-
entific information to risk standard-setting
* To argue that societal response is best guided
by considerations ofprocesss rather than for-
mal methods ofanalysis
The Nature of the Problem
The term "risk acceptability" conveys the im-
pression that society purposely accepts risks as
the reasonable price for some beneficial technolgy
or activity. For some special cases this may ap-
proach reality. Hang-gliding, race-car driving,
mountain climbing, and even adultery are all
high-risk activities in which the benefits are in-
trinsically entwined with the risks. These activi-
ties are exhilarating because they are dangerous.
But most risks of concern are the undesired and
oft unforeseen by-products ofo,herwise beneficial
activities or technologies.
Acceptability is the concept that underlies
judgments of safety. Lowrance, for example, ar-
gues that ". . . a thing is safe ifits attendant risks
are judged acceptable" (3). Setting aside for the
momentthe importantquestions asto how andby
whom suchjudgments are made, probably no riskR. E. KASPERSON
is acceptable if it can be readily reduced still
further. Tb suggest otherwise is to invoke moral
justification for trading practical constraints
against human lives, a position that most risk
guardians will wisely evade. The marketplace,
then, is a poor guide to what risks are acceptable,
as attested to by the century-long struggle by
workers to reduce workplace risks. The occur-
rence of a past risk suggests more about the
balance ofpolitical forces which pertained at that
time than its acceptability to those who bore the
risk.
What does it mean to accept a risk? Does the
daily commuterwho disdains seatbelts acceptthe
risks of automobile driving? Do the workers in
textile plants accept the risk ofcotton dust expo-
sure? At this individual level, guidance can be
found in the practices ofinformed consent formu-
lated to protect subjects in human experiments.
Here risk acceptance involves several important
ingredients: the provision offull information con-
cerning all potential risks, evidence that the sub-
ject understands the information, genuine free-
dom of choice for entering into the experiment,
and the option to terminate one's participation at
any time.
On the basis of the informational criterion
alone, it is apparent that few risks meet the test
ofacceptance. Whereas some classes ofrisk (e.g.,
high probability/acute consequences) are un-
doubtedlybetter understood than others (e.g., low
probability/chronic consequences), it is only a mi-
nority of risks for which the public approaches
anything like full information and understand-
ing. Nor is this irrational for, given the relentless
parade ofrisks that confront the individual, lim-
ited information isundoubtedly aprerequisite for
warding off hypochondria if not despair. There
are also large classes ofrisks, including many of
those most fearedby the public, that are involun-
tary in nature. Even risks-such as workplace
risks-traditionally labeled voluntary in nature
probably fail to have much actual breadth of
choice; workers, for example, tend to have re-
strictedoccupational andresidentialmobility and
are not free to seek out less hazardousjobs, par-
ticularly when jobs are scarce. Suffice it to con-
clude, then, that most technological risks are not
accepted; they are imposed, often without warn-
ing, information, or means ofredress.
Since most risks are imposed on a less than
fully informed risk-bearer, the response is more
properly thought of as tolerance or acquiesence
rather than acceptance. With limited choice and
imperfect knowledge, the individual does not re-
sist the imposition of the risk. As knowledge of
the risk and range ofchoice grow, the individual
will usually become more risk averse and the
degree of risk acceptance will also increase. The
area between the tolerated and the accepted risk
is the latitude available to the risk guardian for
standard-setting (Fig. 1). This structure of risk
response is, ofcourse, specificto aparticularpoint
oftime and may be expected to change.
At the societal level, the issue is considerably
still more complicated. There is little reason to
expect consensus among individuals in their
thresholds of tolerability and acceptability. In
fact, some ofthe most difficult risks are those in
which individual structures ofrisk tolerance tend
to be divergent rather than convergent. Such
appears to be the case, for example, with nuclear
power where there are notable sex differences in
the response to the hazard (4, 5). In such cases,
the current tendency is to set the standard at the
level deemed appropriate by the expert with an
adjustment to reflect what Bill Rowe would term
the risk's "squawk" factor (6). As often ornot, this
adjustment for public response fails to resolve the
issue, leaving the risk guardian perplexed, frus-
trated, and irritated. And the means for commu-
nicating between anxious publics and well-inten-
tioned experts fail, leaving the public distrustful
of the expert and the expert convinced of the
public's irrationality.
Increasingly it is apparent that judgments of
appropriate risk levels are inherently problems of
ethics and politics. Debates over risk are often, at
root, debates over the adequacy and credibility of
the institutions which manage the risk and not
debates over the actual level of risk. Within the
latitude available for risk-setting, the risk man-
ager must weigh and trade offmultiple objectives
and conflicting values. In such decision situa-
tions, the preferred choices will not always be
those with the lowest risk. Above all, the public
wants to be assured thatthese decisions are made
fairly andwith a strongcommitment to the safety
and well-being ofthe public. With this in mind, it
is appropriate to consider current interest in a
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FIGURE 1. Schematic diagram ofindividual response to risk.comprehensive risk standard and the possible
contributions ofscientific knowledge.
The Search for an Analytic Fix
There is a great temptation to tidy up this
confusing mish-mash of risk decisions through
some common yardstick and consistent standard
for risk imposition. Several means have been
proposed: some see in the historical pattern of
risk occurrence evidence that society has arrived
at a recurring balance between risk and benefit
(7). Others see the need for a consistent quantita-
tive level of risk to serve as the basis for all
regulation (8). Still others would have cost effec-
tiveness serve as the guiding principle in re-
sponding to risk across technologies (9).
This search for an analytic fix for the risk
acceptability problem is misguided. Worse still, it
reveals a profound misunderstanding of the na-
ture of the problem. First, it wrongly assumes
that one risk is like any other, whereas it is
patently clear that risks are multidimensional
phenomena that fall into complex groupings.
Death by cancer is not the same as death by
accident; catastrophic risks are more feared and
carry greater social toll than smaller fatality
risks; imposed risks are unlike accepted risks.
Research at Clark University over the past five
years has identified some 19 hazard attributes
which, when factor analyzed for some 93 techno-
logical hazards, fall into some five major factors
which differentiate such hazards (10). When com-
pared with studies ofpublic response to the same
hazards conducted by Paul Slovic and colleagues
at Decision Research, Inc. (11), a remarkably
close correspondence emerges between the struc-
ture of technological hazards and the nature of
public response, providing hope that an overall
taxonomy of such hazards is possible which will
have strong public policy relevance. But it makes
clear that regulatory approaches to risk will need
to be plural, taking account of major important
differences among risks.
Second, decisions on risk levels do not occur in
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isolation from other social objectives and con-
straints. Each risk decision, then, tends to be
technology- or even situation-specific (12). The
particular set of values, scientific information,
cost considerations, and safety opportunities dif-
fer from one risk to another and from one time to
another for the same risk. Moreover, different
regulatory agencies have different legislative
mandates and program priorities for the same
risks. Sound decisions on risk levels and distribu-
tion, therefore, will and should show substantial
variation among even similar risks. However un-
tidy that may appear to some, it is an inescapable
reality of responsible and rational risk manage-
ment, a conclusion, by the way, shared by two
recent appraisals of the risk acceptability issue
(12, 13).
The Contribution of
Scientific Information
The role of the expert in judgments on risk
levels and distributions is to provide information
and analyses to inform the decision process. Such
formal analyses, however, shouldnotpreemptthe
established process which provides participatory
or consultative roles for interested parties. The
purpose of such analyses is to support an expert
judgment for a draft standard which will then be
tested in the political process. Three broad types
ofanalyses-contextual analysis, equity analysis,
and public preference analysis-are essential for
sound decisions (Table 1).
Contextual Analysis
The risk under consideration should be placed
in appropriate contexts to shed light on its social
meaning. Five contexts or comparisons are para-
mount: the risk as compared with natural back-
ground, the risk compared with other risks preva-
lent in society, the risk in the context of the
magnitude ofassociated benefits, the costs ofrisk
reduction, and the risks of available substitutes
(ifneeded).
Table 1. Expert assessment forjudging risk intolerability.
Contextual analysis Equity analysis Public preference analysis
Risks in the context of: Distribution ofrisks, benefits, and Public risk reduction preferences as
Natural background levels
Other extant risks
Magnitude ofbenefits
Costs ofcontrol
Risks ofavailable substitutes
control costs over:
Workers and publics
Generations
Backyards
Social groups
indicated by:
Incurred risk inference
Legal legacy inference
Expressed values
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In the first, the risk is compared with natural
background levels of exposure. This comparison
suggests the increment to risk affordedby the use
of some technology or activity. Large departures
are obvious sources of concern, whereas those
undetectable in variations in natural exposure
merit much less concern. Such analyses have
been helpful in the field ofradiation control.
The second context is the risk compared with
other risks prevalent in society, often with the
assumption that risk levels should be balanced.
Typically, the comparisons are with similar tech-
nologies, other stages ofafuel orproduction cycle,
or risks previously determined to be tolerable by
a particular risk guardian. In the British chemi-
cal industry, for example, ifa given risk contrib-
utes more than 4.0 to the fatal accident frequency
rate-the number offatal accidents in a group of
1000 men in a working lifetime (100 million
hours)-risk reduction is undertaken. Two well-
known comparisons in the energy area are those
of the Rasmussen Report (14) and the Inhaber
analysis (15). The issue in such comparisons is
whether or not the choice of contextual risks
clarifies or obfuscates the risk under consider-
ation. To compare reactor risks with the chance of
being hit by a meteor, radioactive waste reposi-
tory risks withthe danger oflightning, ornuclear
power with automobile fatalities does little to
clarify public choice considerations. There is,
however, considerable value, as Gori has argued
(16), to risk comparisons within a functional class
of products needed to sustain a modern society,
where benefit levels and uses tend to be similar.
Perhaps the most common form of contextual
analysis is a comparison of risks and benefits.
This method recognizes some level of risk above
zero as necessary and balances the benefits ofthe
activity or technology against the risk to deter-
mine how much risk reduction should be under-
taken. The quality ofsuch analyses varies widely,
depending upon such factors as the messiness of
the problem, the skill of the analyst, the way in
which the analytic question is posed, the exis-
tence ofappropriate techniques, and the analyst's
ability to fashion new techniques (17). Benefit
analysis is particularly underdeveloped, with
considerable difficulty often apparent in deter-
mining even whether a particular outcome is
beneficial or harmful (e.g., increased electricity
consumption). While useful as one type of deci-
sion information, by itself risk/benefit analysis
cannot solve, and may obscure, important policy
and ethical issues (e.g., distributivejustice).
A third type of contextual analysis is the cost
effectiveness of risk reduction. The question at
stake is how much society wishes to spend to
avoid a particular consequence. It is well known
that such expenditures vary widely; in 1972, for
example, Sinclairestimatedthat inBritain $2000
was spent to save an employee's life in agricul-
ture, $200,000 in steel handling, and $5 million
in the pharmaceuticals industry (18). In a search
for an analytic fix, Wilson has suggested that a
"risk tax" of$1 million per life be used to achieve
maximum overall reduction in the array ofrisks
facing society (19). But risk levels can also be set
by changes in the slope ofthe curve in risk reduc-
tion efficiency for any given risk (Fig. 2).
A final form ofcontextual analysis involves the
examination of risks of available substitutes.
Actions designed to reduce risks sometimes cre-
ate new and perhaps larger risks, such as in-
creased coal-burning when nuclear plants are
shut down for safety reasons or the use of TRIS-
treated pajamas as a substitute for flammable
materials. Judgments on tolerable levels of risk
imposition must consider the risks likely to ac-
crue from increased use ofsubstitute products or
technologies.
Equity Analysis
Equity analysis is a second-and oft-ne-
glected-need in scientific analysis to support
risk decision-making. Characteristically those
who enjoy the benefits ofa technology are not the
same asthosewhobearthe risks. Risks are rarely
distributed evenly throughout society and they
are sometimes exported to future generations.
Attempts to control risks may benefit different
groups than those who pay the control costs.
While scientific analysis cannot and shouldnot, of
course, resolve equity issues, it can lay bare the
distributional inequities and value problems.
Four types of inequity merit analysis. First is
potential inequity between workers and publics.
cn
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FIGURE 2. Social criteria for risk reduction. After Rowe (6).
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Higher exposure standards for workers are toler-
ated in this society and others than those permit-
ted for publics on the basis ofquestionable moral
assumptions. The societal risk from some prob-
lems-the toxic waste cleanup comes to mind-
can easily be displaced to workers who needjobs.
Second is the inequity over generations. Increas-
ingly, there is concern over the export ofrisks to
the future, particularly where the effects may be
irreversible. Ozone depletion and radioactive
waste disposal are prominent examples. Third is
the geographical inequity often referred to as the
backyards problem. Traditionally, our society has
located noxious facilities and hazardous activities
in the backyards of vulnerable and politically
powerless peoples. Finally, a more general analy-
sis is required to assess impacts across social
groups, including native peoples, minorities, and
social classes.
Public Preference Analysis
The third major type of scientific information
needed forjudgments on risk levels is an assess-
ment ofpublic preferences for risk reduction. The
purpose of such inquiry is not, it should be em-
phasized, to substitute for the direct expression
bythe public ofits wishes but rather to anticipate
what preferences are likely to be and to indicate
where there are large departures in expert and
lay public assessments ofrisk.
Three major types of information concerning
public preferences are useful. Inferences from in-
curred risks, commonly described as "revealed
preferences," use statistical risk and economics
data for risk/benefits trade offs acceptable to the
public. The assumptions are that, by trial and
error, society has arrived at a nearly optimal
balance between risks and benefits, and that pre-
vailing social and economic relationships arejust
and consonant with public values. Both are in
doubt so the results need to be compared with
other public preference indicators. Inference from
legal legacy looks to the past accumulation of
regulatory decisions and court cases for guidance
to appropriate standard-setting. Finally, ex-
pressed preferences involve directly eliciting risk
reduction preferences from the public itself. Con-
siderable progress has occurred in this research,
suggesting that lay publics are basically rational
on risk questions, order risks similarly to experts
but systematically overestimate well-publicized
and dramatic risks and underestimate chronic,
dispersed risks, and are very risk averse for risks
with catastrophic potential.
By putting risks into appropriate contexts, as-
sessing equity issues, and anticipatinglikelypub-
lic preferences, the scientist can provide informa-
tion needed for risk decision-making. However,
the key to effective risk decisions lies in the
process and institutions responsible for the judg-
ments which emerge, an issue to which we now
turn.
Towards an Effective
Decision Process
Viable decisions on risk levels and distribution
require a process consistent with Western demo-
cratic theory and directive to the risk guardian.
Since the public cannot hope to inform itselfand
participate in the innumerable decisions on risk,
it delegates discretion to the legislators who pass
laws and to the regulators who implement them.
Doubts as to the credibility of these institutions
and processes have provoked much ofthe current
debate over risk decision-making. If and when
that credibility is recovered, "how safe is safe
enough" will cease to be the subject of societal
debate. In the meantime, extraordinary efforts
will be required for the recovery oftrust and for
socially acceptable decisions on risks.
In a democracy, what the risk guardian ideally
wants to know to make value-laden decisions is
whatwouldpublic preferences be in the context of
informed consent, where interests have become
clear, issues dissected and debated, opposing
views confronted, and individuals free to choose.
It is a hypothetical state, ofcourse, for a modern
democracy cannot realize such requirements for
risk or for any other public issue. All such deci-
sions will inevitably involve choices between the
interests of society and the prerogatives of the
individual. Public officials make such decisions
not in grand master strokes, but in piecemeal
decisions which emerge in a series ofmoves made
over time. Customarily we think of the goal of
such decisions as lying in realization ofthe "pub-
lic interest," a concept itself the subject of dis-
agreement and confusion (20).
A credible process finds its starting point in the
recognition that power relationships in risk deci-
sion arenas are assymetrical. The creators ofrisk
nearly always have superior knowledge and re-
sources to promote the expansion of potentially
hazardous technologies. A variety of forces in-
cline many scientists and risk guardians in the
direction ofrisk creators. Those who fear the risk,
by contrast, have few resources, limited and usu-
ally tardy access to the decision process. It is this
structure of decision-making which is most at
stake in the current wars over risk tolerability.
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A viable process for risk decisions is one which
recognizes the requirements ofproceduraljustice
and democratic responsibility. The details ofsuch
a process are the subject for a lengthier discus-
sion; suffice it to note here five major consdiera-
tions for such a process.
(1) Decisions on risk are rarely made in isola-
tionbut are part ofbroader societal choices on the
use and expansion ofparticular technologies and
activities. "Best solutions" involve choices which
take account ofcompeting social values and mul-
tiple goals. The appropriate role of the scientist
lies in the estimation and measurement of risk
and the creation of information needed to assess
its meaning, but not in determining its preferred
level or distribution.
(2) Attempts to find an analytic fix for the risk
tolerability problem are misguided. Risk stan-
dard-setting should begin with the recognition
that such standards should be plural in nature,
varying in level and distribution with magni-
tudes ofbenefits, equity consideration, opportuni-
ties for risk reduction, availability of less risky
alternatives, public preferences for risk reduc-
tion, and other considerations.
(3) Risks cannot be made fully voluntary if
society is to realize the potential good associated
with existing and new technologies. The empha-
sis in risk management should be on avoiding
rather than mitigating risk, in making unavoid-
able risks as voluntary as is feasible, and in
compensating the bearers of unavoidable risks
from beneficiaries where possible.
(4) Since risks tend to be imposed rather than
accepted, the burden ofproofshouldbe on the risk
creator to demonstrate the need for the technol-
ogy and the absence ofthe risk.
(5) Fairness in risk imposition is best achieved
by the active participation ofrisk bearers in their
own behalf in decisions as to the tolerability of
particular risk levels and allocations. Risk
bearers should not be dependencies in the deci-
sion process, but require their own technical ca-
pability, right to negotiation, and legitimacy in
the process. They also have the right to full infor-
mation as to the risks which will be imposed upon
them.
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